Science and Identity: Conflictual By Necessity

I've gotten into an interesting discussion with a commenter, who I can' t thank enough for elaborating on the discussion (something I like a lot. Thanks, Laura!). I ended up a lot in terms of a comment in terms the nature of science and identity, so I'm going to post it out here as well. (I left bits and pieces out. For the full thing, see the comments on my earlier post).
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First is that I'll readily admit that identification itself is a very messy thing. As I noted, I very much sympathize with the Eastern view point, which really tries to eliminate identification wholesale, on the grounds that it is subjective and permeable. Not my impulse, personally, but I understand why that exists.

So to the points. There's an interesting view here that I want to address, and it is in regards to the accuracy of identifying things.

In so far as substances, science is able to consistently distinguish certain physical things within its own context (i.e using the assumptions that it indeed holds about things). Ultimately, that accounts for very little. We're still defining the energy that makes up matter in relation to a construction. In other words, science basically tests certain things using assumptions of those things. A full logical reductionist view would be unable to distinguish a coke can from an eyeball, because it's essentially, at root, all the same. In order to distinguish, we tend to use the apparent spacial relations to do that, but even there we've moved right out into the realm of the conceptual. In other words, it's near impossible to have a discussion of the physical realm without getting into the realm of subjective construction.

But that was horribly tangential at some level, so let's move on from there.

Indeed, science is based as you say on the empirical evidence. But as to the empirical evidence says nothing, relatively speaking, about existence without a subjective frame. We can say that x condition occurs with y action, which is the defining mode of the scientific research. Science, indeed, is actually most technically formed on the inductive method, which holds basically holds that there is a causal nature between all things in the universe (not logically all that sound, by the way, but that's what it is). Science does not and can not say anything about existence; it tests certain things, records certain outcomes, and then applies it to the subjective frame which we have.

Essentially, genetic structure is a frame. Science really can't prove the ultimate existence of genetics any more than it can ultimately prove that we went to the Moon. It can say that x effect of genetics causes y effect on person, but it says nothing definitively about what it is recording. Extremely flawed in nature, but it works at what it is intended.

But that's the issue; identity is a category which falls right out of the scientific method by necessity! You can say that genetics cause autism, but you can't speak to the condition itself any more than prior to the statement, because defining x (as necessitated by the very construct of identity)can't be done within causality. You can assert related factors (since those are causal mechanisms), but you can't any more get at it then the subjective category.

So that's where the issue is for me, and where I come in at. Indeed, because you are outside the casual nature, it's not testable like would be required by science, an unfortunate incident of all identity.

That's not to say, even in that relation, genetic factors could not theoretically be the identifying factors. But I address that's imperfect, because you're creating an imperfect, subjective construct that isn't the thing itself in any form.

Indeed, that's why I would try and define it within the human subjective category, of the created "what is" and "what is not", because, though subjective like all identity, it in and of itself addresses the person. Is it tricky? Yes, especially considering there's a subtext, and no one else has come out and defined autism in simple terms. But I would argue for a form that does define an autistic person in terms of the personal "is" and "is not".

As to that identity, well, as you can tell, it's something I'm still working on. Complicated, really.
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More to come soon, most likely!

Cliff