Playacting and Identity

I recently had a little discussion on autismvox.com, when Kristina Chew phrased a thought question. I'm answering it, somewhat tangentially, here.

It's as follows, "Just a thought experiment: What if things got to the point where people tried to “pass” as autistic…". Of course, for me, the first thing I had to think of was, well, what would "trying to "pass" as autistic" would entail, and to whom.

First, since people would probably try to pass as "autistic", it could really be radically different depending on what their information source. If it was for popularity or for representation/mockery (in other words, a low value on realism), there are a few considerations that come into play. It would be amusing and an exercise in acting skill to play "autistic" in the classical sense, because of all of the little details. You could easily do play that role (except, I think, to those who are sensitive to pitch) to the untrained eye, though you would still fall for the trained eye, who would catch the normalcies and stereotyped aspects.

But what if you had to be really serious about this? Say you needed the supports that autism can get you for one reason or another. Let's say you're aiming for Asperger's, for now (not that I'd normally use that in that sense, but it frames it quickly). How would one go about that?

And here it gets interesting.

You'd be able to cut out some of the smaller details (saying that you'd learned not to do this or that, which all are legitimate statements), and go for some of the grosser categories. A lot of different behaviors can be rationalized by an autistic person, and with good reason; autistics aren't fundamentally boxed individuals, and depending on what emphasis was placed where they can learn to do/not learn to do certain things. Even the trained eye would have a tougher time with this kind of representation at first.

The hardest part to get down right, though, would to pass off as representing a totally different thought process, which would only play in a long-term picture. I'd suspect that associational thoughts, some of the more specific personal focuses, and stimuli reactions would be hard to categorically and repeatedly play out, because you'd have no starting point.

I'm taking a look at this from reverse perspective, because some of these things have come up in learning certain social circumstances. Learning the assumptions of human thought was tough (what do people assume? What do they not assume?), and even then I only have a shaky grip on some of it. And stimuli reactions have taken a lot of observation and notation, as to what bothers people, what they notice, what they don't (this is not even as simple as it sounds. I mean, certain things change depending on things such moods, and selective perspective depends on the person's mindset and circumstances).

Now, if you weren't looking for this, you could miss this regardless, but it'd catch me if this wasn't somewhat present. There are some tendencies that I would almost certainly find in someone who was autistics are verbal/writing, and I'd notice if they weren't there over a period of time. But it's not an easy call.

But to pull off such a stunt, you really have to be exhaustive. You'd have to separate media representation from personal representation, and then you'd have to figure out where things were different and similar, and in what ways. And they're pretty subtle differences in representation in certain ways. And, worst of all, a lot of it is linked to past circumstances pretty heavily (personal projects? strong associations (with both associated to and from with each one)), so you'd have to put a lot of thought into that.

Let's say, at least, that you'd have a much easier time playing out a different gender orientation, even with the most high-functioning autistic individuals.

I mean, if you were to replace me and try to be me (we'll assume you look the same for one reason or another, for sanity's sake), you'd have to know an extreme amount about me. And people would notice. I mean, my brother not only knows my favorite number (22), but the rationale behind my favorite number (there are two twos in 22, and when two is my favorite so-called base number this is ideal in a number of ways). You'd have to get all of these details straight, and it'd be incredible. And these kind of details just aren't missed in a fair representation, and if someone was paying attention you'd have to get these details all straight.

Harder part is then getting all of these details then to come up at the right time, and you'd have to know what assumptions did I learn and what ones do I tend to miss, and then apply the right assumptions at the right time, and play the correct misunderstanding.

So would it be possible for, say, certain kinds of accommodations or benefits? Not impossible to an untrained eye. But you'd have to be careful, and you'd have to be pretty exhaustive to do it right. If you were trying to do it with, say, a family, this becomes exponentially harder.

Now, the question might have arisen. "Now what does this have to identity?" Simply enough, I'm arguing by implication that there are aspects to the autistic mindset and qualities which are subtle and much more elusive, having to deal with internal elements, than external elements that are easy to replicate. Autism isn't really about specific behaviors as much as it is about the specific underlying mindset and tendencies of thought and, to a differing degree, character that unifies everyone with the different skill sets. The identity, thus, becomes a little more complex as it deals with many of these factors that normally would come from circumstance in a whole deal of new ways.

Mind you, I've pretty much had to do just this to present anywhere near normal. But that's not quite fair, as I have the biggest case study (almost all others), and I have been able to observe certain things and make inferences to that effect in language, and you wouldn't have that benefit. I used to do that a lot more, but I've really stopped paying as much attention. I mean, my sanity comes first, clearly.

It might be a fun exercise, though. I'll personally send you a gold trophy and aspirin if you can do it for a week convincingly, at least as compensation for the headache.

A Cry of Marginalization

Well, I'm not really sure how to write this, exactly, but here we go, regardless.

I happened to, most recently, get into an argument with a woman over autism, and specifically whether it should be cured. This is not unusual, and I have these discussions frequently.

This one, though, was different, and it was one of the few times I've really lost my temper with someone. I can heavily disagree with someone, and have done so before, but here I was quite honestly infuriated by some of the arguments. I'm not going to go through all of my replies and to the extent of what was being said (it can be found), but I did say it.

The argument, in essence, was about whether the conditions of autism warrant circumstances that would suggest its removal. I have said no, and I will consistently say no. But so long as the message is polite and civil, I will understand (and I think there are some legitimate arguments to that point).

This, though delivered most civilly, was no such argument. It was offensive in nature, by necessity, and I'll be the first to admit that there are some things that can be said about humanity, in a presumptuous, arrogant manner, that will get to me.

The argument? Basically, it goes as follows...

"Autistic people should not exist because they are not as happy and successful as other people"

I would hope that argument would infuriate. After all, it's categorically what has been used to suppress woman, blacks, and Jews at once. It's a stand in argument made by a majority whose social status has been preferential, and it demeans every other person below them to a lower moral standard. It delves into social Darwinisim at its finest. Whoever has been given the most and has the most for this structure is better and deserves to live by that nature. Those who aren't as equipped, don't.

I would have thought that would infuriate. And yet, someone consistently says it, time and time again, and it just is taken as appropriate.

I mean, why? Happiness shouldn't be a moral preferential, it's horrible as such. Happy people, those with the right resources and circumstances, are to be valued above those who don't, based on those right resources and circumstances? Asides from the fact that the conclusion is absurd (for the highest moral pinnacle would be a dose of methamphetamine, though it would bring a moral low), it's preferential in the extreme to circumstances that are never different. The one way you can be secure in the world is where there are no conflicts or contradictions, where everything is singular and the same. But is that a world to hope for?

Now, that's not to say I don't think finding happiness through a considered acceptance of the nuances and difficulties of the world is a bad thing. Quite the contrary, honestly. But I think it is valuable for that consideration and for that journey, and without the kind of conflicts that are engendered by differences, by the new perspective caused by another, for the process of accomplishment, that the happiness engendered by simple pleasure and relief of not having conflicts is shallow and meaningless.

In any event, it's not moral grounds to eliminate people with! Asides from the fact that, at its full conclusion for me, it paints altruism as a viable defense to murder based on the difference of the murdered, it creates a circumstance in which the only goal in life is to be happy, and that it is fiercely unintellectual, because intellectualism is not a great way to happiness. Frankly, I like these distinctions in the world, and an quite shocked that someone would want to eliminate another, pretty harmless perspective on the grounds of the person's own self.


But all of this pales, for me, when you start using the terms of success. I'm not thinking of a better way to demean someone right off the top of my head.

I mean, think about that. Morally, people who have gotten certain milestones (let's take this argument at its safest, so we'll say that it is the goals of the individuals) have a moral authority over those who don't. To look at that more sharply, let's take a heated political race for, oh, the mayor of a town. One candidate uses every ad hominem, dirty trick, lie he can think of, in order to win the election. The other runs a smooth campaign based on principles, refusing to cross certain lines. Both want the job equally, but the former wins. He now has moral authority in this circumstance!

Worst of this was the suggestion that came after was that people couldn't accomplish these things because of, essentially, neurological deficiencies. But would we dare call the latter person deficient? I would dare hope not! Just because the person adopted a certain, different framework through which to view the world should not make her "neurologically deficient".

That may sound incidental, but it has fairly universal applications. People who go off the beaten path tend to have a harder time, and yet what they experience and understand for that should not be demeaned based on a subjective socially inherited icon which we place on them. They may well place it on themselves, too. But it doesn't matter, because it's unrelated to the point.

Now, the person did say that based on their goals, but this almost assumes that people's neurological condition and nothing else influences certain outcomes. And, yet, traditionally speaking, no matter how much two kids, one African American and one Caucasian, are going to be fit for that position they both so badly want, the Caucasian will have a far better chance (note traditionally at the start of that sentence!).

For me, it's a horrible construction. It's the kind of thinking about people, within these narrow, subjective categories, which causes things like people my age having severe image issues, or representation issues of marginalized groups. Which brings me right to where I wanted.

Right now, it is clear that the language against autistics has not reached the level of consideration it has for most groups, and it's painfully clear with things like this. This language would never have been tolerated like in a race context since the Civil Rights movement, and yet it's used here, plain as day. It's amazing, honestly. It's harmful language that most people would say that we, as a society, have attempted to move past, and it's thrown right in my face like this. And I have no right to be angry about this?

I wonder now about how many such groups are never getting out the door like autistics. How many can't have legitimate, angry feelings about being so horribly marginalized. How many more we, as a society, have failed up to this point so poorly.

Advocacy really needs to do a better job. No, we as people need to do a better job than this.

Science and Identity: Conflictual By Necessity

I've gotten into an interesting discussion with a commenter, who I can' t thank enough for elaborating on the discussion (something I like a lot. Thanks, Laura!). I ended up a lot in terms of a comment in terms the nature of science and identity, so I'm going to post it out here as well. (I left bits and pieces out. For the full thing, see the comments on my earlier post).
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First is that I'll readily admit that identification itself is a very messy thing. As I noted, I very much sympathize with the Eastern view point, which really tries to eliminate identification wholesale, on the grounds that it is subjective and permeable. Not my impulse, personally, but I understand why that exists.

So to the points. There's an interesting view here that I want to address, and it is in regards to the accuracy of identifying things.

In so far as substances, science is able to consistently distinguish certain physical things within its own context (i.e using the assumptions that it indeed holds about things). Ultimately, that accounts for very little. We're still defining the energy that makes up matter in relation to a construction. In other words, science basically tests certain things using assumptions of those things. A full logical reductionist view would be unable to distinguish a coke can from an eyeball, because it's essentially, at root, all the same. In order to distinguish, we tend to use the apparent spacial relations to do that, but even there we've moved right out into the realm of the conceptual. In other words, it's near impossible to have a discussion of the physical realm without getting into the realm of subjective construction.

But that was horribly tangential at some level, so let's move on from there.

Indeed, science is based as you say on the empirical evidence. But as to the empirical evidence says nothing, relatively speaking, about existence without a subjective frame. We can say that x condition occurs with y action, which is the defining mode of the scientific research. Science, indeed, is actually most technically formed on the inductive method, which holds basically holds that there is a causal nature between all things in the universe (not logically all that sound, by the way, but that's what it is). Science does not and can not say anything about existence; it tests certain things, records certain outcomes, and then applies it to the subjective frame which we have.

Essentially, genetic structure is a frame. Science really can't prove the ultimate existence of genetics any more than it can ultimately prove that we went to the Moon. It can say that x effect of genetics causes y effect on person, but it says nothing definitively about what it is recording. Extremely flawed in nature, but it works at what it is intended.

But that's the issue; identity is a category which falls right out of the scientific method by necessity! You can say that genetics cause autism, but you can't speak to the condition itself any more than prior to the statement, because defining x (as necessitated by the very construct of identity)can't be done within causality. You can assert related factors (since those are causal mechanisms), but you can't any more get at it then the subjective category.

So that's where the issue is for me, and where I come in at. Indeed, because you are outside the casual nature, it's not testable like would be required by science, an unfortunate incident of all identity.

That's not to say, even in that relation, genetic factors could not theoretically be the identifying factors. But I address that's imperfect, because you're creating an imperfect, subjective construct that isn't the thing itself in any form.

Indeed, that's why I would try and define it within the human subjective category, of the created "what is" and "what is not", because, though subjective like all identity, it in and of itself addresses the person. Is it tricky? Yes, especially considering there's a subtext, and no one else has come out and defined autism in simple terms. But I would argue for a form that does define an autistic person in terms of the personal "is" and "is not".

As to that identity, well, as you can tell, it's something I'm still working on. Complicated, really.
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More to come soon, most likely!

Cliff

An Argument Against the Person as a Biological Being

I'll admit, I haven't been here for a while, because I've been a little under the weather for the past few weeks, for various reasons that I don't want to get into right away. But I'm finally getting around back to this, and this has been on my mind for a while (and, lo and behold, it actually addresses some of the comments in general here and elsewhere).

Now, I'll admit the title may either be confusing or absurd, depending on how much credit one is willing to give me. After all, aren't people physical beings? Isn't being a human a physical existence by necessity? And you aren't really going to start positing some form of dualism, after having argued against it for some two years now, are you?

Well, in order of the listed: No, almost certainly, absolutely not. The last point should be clear enough, but the prior two, indeed, need some explanation.

I first should go out of my way to make clear that I am distinguishing what I am going to call the "human" and the "person", as I think there's a clear distinction to make. I am not distinguishing the actual use of the terms, but using each one to represent certain constructions (in other words, we use "human" differently than I will use it consistently here, and the same with "person").

On one hand, the human is the physical being, the one we can point to and see as a person. In a way, what's being observed (and, again, I am not a dualist, and am assuming this to a degree) is a coordinated energy mechanism. Energy is taken in, stored, shifted, manipulated, sent out, all in different ways as to make one. This energy forms the matter of a human, stemming all the way from the DNA to the fully formed brain and everything in between.

A human is defined strictly in terms of the physical, and conceptual terms only apply as to that they group the object, but there is nothing more than the classification of the object. I mean this in the broadest terms; genetics are no less a circumstance than a brain injury caused by a brick, and neither take precedence.

One might argue here that genetics are what would define the human, but I'll heavily digress here. After all, you'd be able to make the argument that discarded skin cells, so long as the DNA was maintained, was just as much the person as their entire head, simply for that structure. If you try and define a person as an intact human being with a specific physical structure (in other words a functioning body), the person changes constantly enough that this is hard to maintain in an ultimate sense, and even if you allow the criteria to be vague enough to only include the larger details you have to accept that humanity would be lost if the person lost their hand. You can make an exception here to define the person, but assuming we don't want to be so narrow, let's move on.

But what does that leave us with? Well, what we have here is a specific thing indeed; the exact energy location of something at a specific time would be defined as a person (energy, again, in the broadest sense; since the atomic structures are that of energy, the distinction between matter and energy is ultimately pointless). It never exists for more than an instant, and what is nothing more than its structure, with no meaning attached. Humanity, in its typical sense, vanishes; there is nothing to truly distinguish it from a pillow.

Should we equate this to the person, in so far as identity? It's been done, and it's a legitimate point of view. In fact, the idea of impermanence of existence and identity is a Buddhist principle. And, if taking a look at the world from a strictly physicalist perspective, it's the logical one.

But I'm going to argue here for human identity, and while the result may not be seen as satisfactory, for me it is enough.


The personal construction of the world, indeed, doesn't exist within such a physicalist construction. We identify certain things, be it "Bob", "bottle", or "pillow" as distinct structures of certain things. We define them as for their relationships to other structures. We also define certain relationships within those structures as more consequential to their being (in other words, I am not going to define a bottle as "made up of a solid" as much as "often holds certain substances").

With people, we similarly define within certain structures, and overlay them with other structures. Certain constructions define the person (does the person have red hair? Does she care much about others?) and we'll overlay them with superstructures that sort these constructions with value (so kindness will be definitional to our view of a person more than the red hair (please tell me I'm right about this. We really aren't so shallow that we're going to put red hair above kindness, are we?)).

Of those structures, the placement is a little tricky, but typically what we at least aspire to put first is the person's mental being over the person's physical structure, and then certain mental qualities over mental frames of reference. I say this with extreme hesitancy; do we really care if a person is inclined to, say, quality and kind of person over the social structures in which they think(for example, is the personal drive towards examination and to the ways they examine things over that they think about legal terms)? I think so, but that may be optimistic. We're also going to put the qualities which are more general to the person over time to those that don't. So we tend to put intelligence, which lasts a lifetime, over frustrated set of mind, as it lasts for only a certain period of time (assuming it's not a general tendency and mode of thinking).

We aren't going to define a person by the stricter physicalist structure. I mean, do we care about the precise brain state which a person is in over the personal quality that it entails? I don't usually think so. People don't even often know what the associated brain state is for, say, anger, so to morally elevate such a thing is ridiculous.

Are these qualities rooted in "reality", outside of people? No, not inherently. But that's a horrible discriminant. Genetics does not exist outside of people's construction; it is only by pulling certain energy structures into a related meaning that we assume it to have that it has meaning. "DNA" does not exist in a strict physicalist reality.

Indeed, it is in these relations, inside the creation of the "is and is not", and as to the comparative value of such things, that creates the person.

Are these qualities "personcentric" (hey, I make up words too!), defining people as separate from reality? Actually, no. Remember the very beginning about constructions before I got into people. Constructions and their relations are used to identify pillows as much as people.

Are they hard to measure? Yes, if not impossible. We can make educated guesses as to how certain structures would relate to people as if we were in their places, but because we essentially can't do a strict comparison of being in certain states as to definitively compare their existence, we're can only guess. I think the consensus is that there is some consensus here, but it isn't perfect, and being more open-minded helps here.

So this isn't scientific. But, considering that science is simply the inductive method, a method which is inherently flawed and limited (and, despite myth, not inherently logical at all. Quite the opposite), I don't feel uncomfortable with that at all. It has its uses, but it has also as many limits, and the principle doesn't flow well into principles of construction.

So, what am I getting to here, and why is this on my blog about autism? Well, I'm essentially arguing that autism as a personal quality should be effectively separated from the terms of the physical and into the terms of the personal. To define autism in terms of genetics or in terms of environmental factors is no different than defining compassion in terms of genetics or in terms of environmental factors? It is one thing to say that a certain thing creates or fosters something, but to say that it "is" it is a step too far.

Now, this rests in large part on my earlier post (in which I constructed autism as a personal type of existence), but assuming that we don't assume autism to be a word that simply overlaps behaviors, it is important that autism not be defined as a physical identity. If we want to, we either must accept fully what we are doing and admit we are introducing a half-hearted physicalist conclusion, and that we essentially are talking about a conceptual "all-and-nothing" (all energy, no concept).

So, to look at a specific comment (I'm not singling out this comment for reasons of argument against, but it perfectly shows the point)

We may not be able to fully explicate the genetics, but that doesn't obviate its existential value. In other words, the genetics, whatever they may be, will define the existential state of autism. The issue you identify - whether the things we identify as autistic traits comprise a peronality or a disorder - is secondary.

I would have to quite strongly argue the contrary. The genetics are in fact of no existential value to the quality. To me, it isn't nearly as important in what order or to what effect genetics has to something like, say, dedication as much as the quality itself and what it does (the only way in which it is of any value is probably as to the nature/nurture debate, if one was to make claims as to the consistency of personal identity). A person, most simply, is not a biological mechanism, even if biologically caused.

In Other News...

I will be in at Artistic Spectrum event at the Jewish Community Center in Manhattan! Here's a notice from Beth Rosenberg, who is organizing the event, and with the note that I will be reading some of my own writing at the event (which I have not posted here), so I hope people come out for it!

Fruits, and Other Delicious Things, Of the World

I've been admittedly a little busy of late, with some additional stress, being in a measure of pain from stimuli, since I'm listening to an opera for a humanities class, which takes, for me, subjecting yourself to hell for a grade to a whole new level. I've also been thinking about home, where, I should most proudly note, Mom just launched her bid for a state Supreme Court, and actually taking time to relax over my break (last week), something I've traditionally had issues with.

You'd think I wouldn't have time to think, and while this is true, I've been surprised that I've been thinking rather intensely of late, as well. Though not too focused, it's really been about my past, and to some degree coming to terms with some of those details.

Indeed, I think much of this calls to how much I have put myself, to be more precise clear access to my entirety, in various things and concepts. San Fransisco and dim sum, indeed, are some of many things which, upon chance, can quickly remind myself of who I am and was, where I stand, and how that happened. I even get to drink

There are many reasons for that, however. And while some of it isn't pretty, easily put, I was strongly how some of it has been just that.

In fact, where I was thinking the most was when I was heading back to school. My flight plan had me first going to San Fransisco. Now, in all of my life, I have absolutely love San Fransisco and, after two years here, will look for a school in the area. I am one of those who, in fact, left their heart in San Fransisco, and so much more. Some of my most important moments growing up happened there, mostly in Chinatown. Without that city, I'd be a very different person, on many levels.

I thought it was going to be a little bitter, actually. Though it would be nice to see the city from above, I'd never get into the city itself, and it'd feel like an opportunity missed. I wouldn't even get to smell the air, less than enjoy some of the food.

Great thing is, I really did underestimate SFO.

For one, I ended up right next to my gate, so I had a good half-hour to explore. Which, in an airport, doesn't necessarily mean much, because I'm not really a shopper. But I wanted breakfast, so I took off in pursuit of something to eat.

And, in luck that I rarely seem to have, I come right across a place that sold dim sum.

Dim sum, for me, is something similar to Pad Thai, something that really has strong associations, and has a sense of magnificence in eating that's hard to match. It's got an even stronger pull than Pad Thai, for the rarity, and the associations are different. While Pad Thai has some associations with the feeling of personal accomplishment, dim sum gets that of personal exploration.

Needless to say, I jumped into line and ordered my share, and in very little time I was back, several years prior.

The memory isn't specific, but what is important is; I'm at Yank Sing with Mom. I don't remember exactly when (I'd like to say a year or two ago, maybe), and we're talking, and while the conversation went all over the place, it was always carried with a sense of inspiration or interest at the museum we had just visited, about literature, about the city itself (which she knows at a level I don't, having lived there several years while working at a law firm). Most of all, though, I'm laughing, and I'm happy.

Happy in a way that at once is fleeting, and yet so accessible. Scarlet by association, powerful, mysterious, even foreign. And yet, I knew right where to find it, in a broad sense.

Of course, it brings up how much I have put myself, or to be more precise access to my entirety, in various things. Be it a noodle dish, a pork dumpling, a skyscraper, a character, I, in the very physical world, come across what I was, what I stand for, and how I got to where I am. And while that's now all a positive thing (since sometimes trauma gets invested in one thing or another), it isn't certainly a bad thing.

Indeed, I have put myself in the fruits, and other delicious things, of the world.